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ABSTRACT
Deep Neural Networks are well known to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks and backdoor attacks, where minor modifications on
the input can mislead the models to give wrong results. Although
defenses against adversarial attacks have been widely studied, re-
search on mitigating backdoor attacks is still at an early stage.
It is unknown whether there are any connections and common
characteristics between the defenses against these two attacks.
In this paper, we present a unified framework for detecting mali-
cious examples and protecting the inference results of Deep Learn-
ing models. This framework is based on our observation that both
adversarial examples and backdoor examples have anomalies dur-
ing the inference process, highly distinguishable from benign sam-
ples. As a result, we repurpose and revise four existing adversarial
defense methods for detecting backdoor examples. Extensive evalu-
ations indicate these approaches provide reliable protection against
backdoor attacks, with a higher accuracy than detecting adversarial
examples. These solutions also reveal the relations of adversarial
examples, backdoor examples and normal samples in model sen-
sitivity, activation space and feature space. This can enhance our
understanding about the inherent features of these two attacks, as
well as the defense opportunities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Past years have witnessed the rapid development of Deep Learning
(DL) technology. State-of-the-art Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
can outperform conventional machine learning models in many
artificial intelligence tasks, such as image classification [20, 24],
speech recognition [57], natural language processing [33]. The
high and reliable performance of DNNs is attributed to the models’
complex structures and large numbers of parameters.
However, such model complexity also brings security vulner-
abilities, which can be exploited by adversaries to compromise
the DNN applications. Two typical examples are adversarial at-
tacks [49] and backdoor attacks [17] (Figure 1). In both types of
attacks, the adversary injects carefully-crafted perturbations on the
input samples to fool the DNN models. Those perturbations are so
small that humans will never be tricked. In adversarial attacks, the
perturbation is specifically generated for each sample to mislead
the target model. In backdoor attacks, the adversary produces a
universal perturbation (i.e., trigger), and modifies the target model
correspondingly to misclassify each sample with the trigger. These
attacks have significantly threatened the DNN applications, espe-
cially in the safety- and security-critical scenarios, e.g., autonomous
driving [2], malware detection [55], user authentication [8].
Extensive studies have been conducted to mitigate adversarial
attacks [3, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 35, 40, 42, 44, 46, 56]. In contrast, there
are fewer satisfactory solutions against backdoor attacks. Most
works [7, 19, 31, 43, 53, 59] attempted to detect and remove mali-
cious backdoor in the target models. However, due to the defender’s
limited knowledge about the attack techniques and configurations,
those methods can only be applied to simple backdoor attacks (e.g.,
one targeted class, simple trigger pattern), and they can be easily
evaded by adaptive attacks [50]. Other approaches aim to identify
poisoned data in the training set [6, 12, 52]. They are not applicable
when the defender has no access to the training data.
In this paper, we focus on the mitigation of backdoor attacks in
a different direction: detecting backdoor samples at the inference
phase. With such protection, all malicious samples will be ruled
out, and the compromised models will still give correct prediction
results for normal samples. Achieving this goal is challenging as the
trigger can have arbitrary sizes and patterns, which are agnostic
to the defender. Existing detection solutions either are limited to
simple triggers [9, 14] or require priori knowledge about the triggers
[45], making them less practical.
Our proposed strategy is based on two insights. The first one
is that there exist some similarities between adversarial examples
and backdoor examples. Both of them require small perturbations
to enforce wrong prediction output. As such, they exhibit certain
anomaly during the inference process, and can be detected in a simi-
lar way. Based on this observation, we can apply the methodologies
of detecting adversarial examples to backdoor example detection.
We identify four effective approaches to distinguish backdoor ex-
amples from normal samples based on their model sensitivities,
behaviors in the feature space and activation space.
The second insight is that adversarial examples and backdoor ex-
amples have certain differences caused by attack attributes. To meet
the universality requirement, backdoor examples need larger scale
of perturbations, making them further from the model decision
boundary and normal samples. As a result, we need to make some
modifications on the methodology workflows and configurations
to identify backdoor examples. Besides, due to those differences,
we observe that these methodologies have a better accuracy of de-
tecting backdoor examples than adversarial examples, even though
they are originally designed to defeat adversarial attacks.
We build a unified framework to study the adversarial and back-
door examples. It consists of four approaches to detect malicious
examples. This framework provides two functionalities. First, it
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Figure 1: Illustration of an adversarial attack (left part) and backdoor attack (right part) on a DNNmodel for face recognition.
enables us to analyze the behavior similarities and differences of
various types of samples from multiple angles. Second, it can be
readily adopted to identify malicious examples and protect the
DNN applications. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one
work [37] investigating the relations between adversarial and back-
door examples, from the perspective of attacks. We present the first
study to unify these two threats for the defense purpose.
With this framework, we extensively evaluate the effectiveness
of the methods in detecting different types of backdoor attacks on
different models and datasets. We provide seven remarks, revealing
the inherent characteristics of adversarial and backdoor examples,
as well as the detection approaches. We hope the framework and
the findings can inspire researchers to study the malicious samples
in a unified way, and come up with more effective and efficient
detection solutions. This framework is released online1.
Our main contributions are listed below:
• We present the first systematic study about the relations be-
tween adversarial examples and backdoor examples from the de-
fense perspective. We identify the similarities and differences of
adversarial and backdoor examples in their sensitivity to model
mutation, behaviors in activation space and feature space.
• We apply four detection methodologies from adversarial attacks
to backdoor attacks, and achieve better detection accuracy.
• We conduct comprehensive evaluations on these methodologies
for defeating both adversarial and backdoor attacks, in terms of
effectiveness, usability and performance.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORKS
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Formally, the target DNN model is denoted as a parameterized
function fθ : X 7→ Y that maps an input tensor x ∈ X to an
output tensor y ∈ Y. Given a clean sample x , the adversary’s goal
is to find the corresponding adversarial example (AE) x˜ = x + δ ,
such that fθ will predict it as a different label. The adversarial
perturbation δ should be kept as small as possible. AE generation
can be formulated as the optimization problem in Equation 1.
minimize: ∥δ ∥
subject to: fθ (x + δ ) , fθ (x)
(1)
1https://github.com/kaidi-jin/backdoor_samples_detection.
Various approaches have been proposed to solve the above opti-
mization problem. Szegedy et al. [49] adopted the L-BFGS algorithm
to generate AEs. Then a couple of gradient-based methods were
introduced to enhance the attack techniques: the gradient descent
evasion attack [1] calculated the gradients of neural networks to
generate AEs; Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [15] calculated
the adversarial perturbation based on the sign of gradients, which
was further improved by its iterative versions (I-FGSM [25] and MI-
FGSM [11]). Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [26] iteratively applied
FGSM with small perturbations to get the final AEs. Deepfool [36]
is another iterative method that outperforms previous attacks by
searching for the optimal perturbation across the decision bound-
ary. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [39] estimated
the saliency map of pixels w.r.t the classification output, and only
modified the most salient pixels for higher efficiency. One pixel
attack [48] is an extreme-case attack where only one pixel can be
modified to fool the classifier. A more powerful attack, C&W [5],
was proposed by updating the objective function to minimize lp
distance between AEs and normal examples. C&W can effectively
defeat Defensive Distillation [40] and other defenses with assisted
models [5] with very high attack success rates.
2.2 Backdoor Attacks
For a given DNN model fθ with the parameters θ , the adversary
attempts to find backdoored parameters θ∗ and a trigger δ , such
that the backdoor model fθ ∗ can give correct results for all normal
samples x ∈ X, but predict the backdoor example (BE) x + δ as
different labels. Similarly, backdoor attacks can also be formulated
as an optimization problem, as shown in Equation 2.
minimize: ∥θ∗ − θ ∥ + λ∥δ ∥
subject to: ∀x ∈ X, fθ ∗ (x) = fθ (x)
∀x ∈ X, fθ ∗ (x + δ ) , fθ (x)
(2)
Solving this optimization problem directly is difficult. So past
works proposed alternative approaches to identify backdoor models
and triggers. Badnets [17] adopted poisoning attack technique: the
adversary first identifies the trigger pattern δ . Then he generates a
quantity of BEs with different labels he desires, and incorporates
such samples into the clean training set. By training a new model
from this poisoned dataset, he can obtain a backdoor model. Liu et
al. [32] proposed an enhanced attack: the adversary can directly
modify a set of neurons in the internal layer without the need to
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Figure 2: Visualization of adversarial examples and back-
door examples with the model classification boundary.
train models. Yao et al. [60] studied the transferability feature of
backdoor attacks: if the adversary injects backdoor into a teacher
model, the student models transferred from this teacher model may
still contain the backdoor, and be vulnerable to BEs.
2.3 Comparisons
Adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks have some similarities, as
well as distinct features. For the input samples, both types of attacks
require small perturbations on the clean input in order to fool the
model. The perturbation in adversarial attacks is input-specific: for
each sample, the adversary needs to calculate the corresponding
perturbation. In contrast, the perturbation in backdoor attacks is
universal. The trigger is fixed for all samples belonging to all classes.
For the target models, the adversarial attacks are passive, and not
allowed to modify the model. Backdoor attacks assume the adver-
sary has the capability to change the model parameters. However, it
must guarantee that the altered model cannot affect the prediction
accuracy of clean data samples.
Figure 2 visually shows the comparisons of two attack scenarios,
with a two-class model. Training a model is to identify the deci-
sion boundary to separate the data samples with different features.
Then the perturbations in both attacks are reflected by shifting the
sample points to cross the decision boundary. The perturbation in
adversarial attacks is input-specific. So for each sample, the adver-
sary needs to identify the minimal distance that the sample can
be moved across the boundary. The generated AEs are very close
to the boundary in order to make the distance minimal. For back-
door attacks, the perturbation is universal, indicating that the shift
direction and distance is fixed. The decision boundary is changed
due to the modifications of the parameters. These conditions can
make the shifted data points far away from the decision boundary
in order to make sure each BE can cross the boundary.
2.4 Defenses
Mitigating adversarial attacks. Existing solutions can be clas-
sified into four categories. The first one is adversarial training
[21, 46], where AEs are used with normal examples together to
train DNN models to recognize and correct malicious samples. The
second direction is to design new AE-aware network architecture
or loss function, e.g., Deep Contractive Networks [16], Input Gra-
dient Regularization [44], Defensive Distillation [40], Magnet [35],
Generative Adversarial Trainer [28]. The third direction is to in-
troduce a preprocessing function to transform the input samples
and remove the adversarial perturbations by gradient masking
[3, 10, 18, 42, 56]. The last category is to detect adversarial examples
[4, 13, 23, 34, 51, 54, 58]. Compared with the first three directions,
these methods do not need to train a new model with different
structures or datasets, or to alter the inference computing pipeline.
So we will focus on the detection-based solutions in this paper.
Mitigating backdoor attacks. There are also several directions to
defeat backdoor attacks. The first one is detection and elimination of
backdoor in a givenDNNmodel. To achieve this, past works adopted
boundary outlier detection [7, 19, 43, 53], Meta Neural Analysis [59],
and artificial brain stimulation [31]. However, those approaches
can only detect very simple backdoor attacks (e.g., one targeted
class, simple triggers), and can be easily bypassed by advanced
attacks [50]. Fine-pruning was used to remove malicious backdoor
in the model [30]. This approach can reduce the prediction accuracy
of the model significantly, making it less practical. The second
direction is to identify poisoned data in the training set [6, 12, 52].
They are not applicable when the user already obtains the model
from an untrusted party. The third direction is to detect backdoor
examples [9, 14, 45]. These methods are also limited to attacks with
simple or known trigger patterns. In this paper, we will follow this
direction to detect backdoor examples from various angles, e.g.,
model sensitivity, activation space and feature space.
3 DETECTION METHODOLOGIES
3.1 Overview
We aim to build a unified framework, consisting of various detection
approaches to identification of both AEs and BEs generated from
various attacks. This framework can serve as an anomaly detector
along with the target DNN models to rule out potential malicious
samples before inference. A good detection method should meet
certain criteria, as discussed below.
Generality. This requirement can be reflected in two directions.
First, the candidate method should not be attack-specific. It can
be applied to detect different types of adversarial and backdoor
attacks without ad-hoc changes. Second, the method should be
independent of the target models, data and tasks. It is not allowed
to modify the models or inference computation. But it can collect
the internal information during the inference.
Effectiveness. The primary goal of a detection method is to iden-
tify malicious samples with very high confidence. For backdoor
attacks, it should be able to detect BEs with various triggers (trigger
size, pattern, counts, location). We use the detection True Positive
Rate in our framework to evaluate the effectiveness of each detec-
tion method, which is defined as the ratio of correctly identified
malicious sample count to the total malicious sample count.
Usability. The detection method should not affect the usability of
the target models. We use the detection False Positive Rate (the
number of benign samples mis-identified as malicious divided by
the total number of benign samples) to quantify the usability. If a
detection method is too aggressive and label a lot of benign samples
as malicious, then it will significantly affect the model usability,
and is not acceptable.
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Figure 3: Workflow of Model Mutation.
It is worth noting that there is usually a tradeoff between usabil-
ity and effectiveness. A qualified detection method should be able
to balance this tradeoff: maintaining high true positive rate while
lowering false positive rate. We will adopt the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve to reflect the detector’s capability of
handling such tradeoff.
Performance. A good detection method should have performance
efficiency. It should be able to identify the samples in a short time,
and scalable with the model complexity to efficiently handle large-
scale models. We measure the detection time to quantify the per-
formance of a method. Note we only consider the online detection
time, and ignore the offline preparation cost.
We identify four qualified methodologies in our framework to
detect both AEs and BEs, satisfying the above requirements. Our
selection is based on two observations. The first one is the sim-
ilarity between AEs and BEs. Since both two types of examples
are generated by adding small perturbations to enforce the models
to make wrong predictions, they exhibit similar features in the
interaction with the model, which are distinguishable from be-
nign samples. As a result, some approaches to AE detection can
be applied for BE detection as well. The second observation is the
difference between AEs and BEs: BEs are generally farther away
from the decision boundary than AEs, and show more robustness.
So some approaches for detecting AEs may not work for BEs. Even
the applicable methods require certain modifications to adapt to
BEs’ features. Below, we describe the details of four methodologies.
3.2 Model Mutation
Detecting AEs. The first approach we consider is model mutation
[54]. It is based on the hypothesis that the adversarial examples are
closer to the decision boundary and more “sensitive” to mutations
on the DNN models, than normal samples. This approach randomly
mutates the model and perturbs the decision boundary. Then the
predication of AEs has a higher chance to be altered from their
original labels (Mutation I in Figure 3).
Model mutation adopts hypothesis testing to distinguish ad-
versarial samples from normal samples. Specifically given a DNN
model fθ and a sample x , we can establish two exclusive hypoth-
esises: H0 (x is an adversarial example): ς(x) > ςh and H1 (x is a
benign example: ς(x) ≤ ςh ), where ς(x) is the label change rate of
sample x and ςh is a threshold to determine the sample attributes.
The intuition is that ς(x) is statistically much larger when x is an
adversarial example than normal ones, which can be distinguished
by the threshold ςh .
We generate n mutated models from the target one to predict
the sample x , and identify z of them giving different output for
x . Then we adopt the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to
check which hypothesis is satisfied. Three parameters, α , β , δ are
used to control the probability of error tolerance. Then SPRT is
calculated in Equation 3, where p1 = ςh − δ and p0 = ςh + δ . The
hypothesis H0 is accepted if SPRT ≤ β1−α , indicating that x is an
adversarial example. Otherwise, H1 is accepted and x is normal.
SPRT =
pz1 (1 − p1)n−z
pz0 (1 − p0)n−z
(3)
Detecting BEs. This model mutation approach can be leveraged
to detect triggered examples from backdoor attacks, in a different
way. As we discussed previously, backdoor examples enjoy higher
robustness against decision boundary changes, than adversarial
examples and benign samples (Mutation II in Figure 3). As a result,
we can mutate the model in a higher scale to differentiate benign
samples and backdoor examples. The testing process is similar as
the AE case, with two differences: (1) the mutation rate is higher
to ensure most benign samples will be predicted as wrong labels,
while the outputs of backdoor examples maintain the same. (2) The
hypothesises now is reversed: H0 (x is a benign sample): ς(x) > ςh
and H1 (x is a triggered example): ς(x) ≤ ςh .
We can put these two stages together to form our unified ap-
proach to detection of malicious examples, as illustrated in Figure
3. First, we set a small mutation rate to check if the sample is an
AE. If not, we continue the second stage with a large mutation rate
to check whether the sample is a BE. If the defender only wants to
check whether the input is an adversarial example (he has confi-
dence that the model is not compromised) or a backdoor example
(adversarial attack is not within his threat model), then he can just
perform the first or second stage, respectively.
3.3 Activation Space
Detecting AEs. This methodology [23] explores the sample be-
haviors in the activation space of different network layers. The
hypothesis is that the behaviors of normal samples are different
from that of adversarial examples. Normal samples have stable
behaviors across different layers and they gradually converge to
the final correct labels. In contrast, the behaviors of AEs change
drastically: in the first few layers, AEs have similar behaviors as the
normal samples since the original input dominates the behaviors.
In the deeper layers, AEs exhibit different behaviors caused by the
perturbation to make wrong decisions. Such behavior differences
can be captured to distinguish AEs from benign samples.
The detection consists of two stages. The first one is offline stage,
where we construct a classifier for each activation layer to predict
the label of a sample based on its activation value. For the activation
layer i , the goal is to train a classifier ci : f 1...iθ (x) 7→ y for a sample
(x ,y) where f 1...iθ (x) is the activation value of sample x at layer
i . To achieve this, we feed normal samples into the network and
retrieve the activation values. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
is adopted to reduce the dimension of the activation value. A KNN
classifier ci is trained over this set (f 1...iθ (x),y) for layer i . With the
classifiers, we calculate the priori switching probability of predicted
labels between consecutive activation layers (Equation 4).
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pis = P(ci (f 1...iθ (x)) , ci−1(f 1...i−1θ (x))),∀i ∈ [1, l] (4)
The second one is online stage, which is shown in Figure 4.
For the target sample x , we feed it into the network, collect the
activation values, and use the corresponding classifier to predict its
label yi = ci (f 1...iθ (x)). A normal sample always has low switching
probability though all layers, while AEs can have abrupt increase in
the probability due to the behavior changes. To quantify this effect,
we estimate the log likelihood of the target example x by Equation
5, and compare it with a threshold τ . The sample x is flagged as an
AE when LLx < τ .
LLx =
l∑
i=1
log[12 + (−1)
(yi,yi−1)(12 − p
i
s )] (5)
Detecting BEs. Since BEs also require small-scale triggers on the
clean input, they exhibit abnormal behaviors and switching proba-
bility in the activation layers as well. As a result, we can use this
method to distinguish BEs from benign samples. Figure 4 shows
the workflow of this method.
3.4 Kernel Density Estimation
Detecting AEs. This approach [13] focuses on the anomaly detec-
tion in the feature space. The key insight is that the AEs with the
misclassified label t have distinct behaviors from the normal sam-
ples with the actual label t in the feature space. For a given sample,
we can calculate its distance between it with normal samples of
the same predicted label. A larger distance indicates the sample is
potentially malicious.
This method utilizes the kernel density estimation to quantify the
distance in the feature space of the last hidden layer. As illustrated
in Figure 5, for the target sample x , its predicted label is denoted
as t . Then we obtain a set Xt of training samples with the same
label t . Equation 6 gives the density estimation (KDE) to measure
the distance, where ϕ(x) is the last hidden layer activation vector
for point x . If KDE(x , t) < τ , x is reported as a malicious sample,
where τ is a predefined threshold.
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Figure 5: Workflow of Kernel Density Estimation.
KDE(x , t) = 1|Xt |
∑
xi ∈Xt
exp
(
−∥ϕ(xi ) − ϕ(x)∥2/σ 2
)
(6)
Detecting BEs. Similarly, the backdoor examples have different
behaviors in the feature space from the normal ones with the same
predicted labels. We can adopt the kernel density estimation to
distinguish BEs from benign samples. It is hard to identify AEs and
BEs as they have similar features. So we use the same threshold to
detect both of them.
3.5 Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
Detecting AEs. This approach [34] follows the similar idea as Ker-
nel Density Estimation. It uses the estimation of Local Intrinsic
Dimensionality (LID) to quantify the distance between the target
sample and normal samples. Given a sample x and the set Xt of
normal samples with the same predicted label, the Maximum likeli-
hood Estimator (MLE) of LID at x is calculated in Equation 7, where
ri (x) represents the Euclidean distance of feature maps between x
and its i-th nearest neighbor within Xt , and rk (x) is the maximum
of the neighbor distances. The LID value of an AE is significantly
higher than normal data. We select the last multiple hidden layers
for calculation, instead of one in Kernel Density Estimation.
LID(x , t) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log ri (x ,Xt )
rk (x ,Xt )
)−1
(7)
Detecting BEs. Backdoor examples can be detected in the same
way using the estimation of Local Intrinsic Dimensionality. We can
adopt the same detector of AEs and the threshold to distinguish
BEs from normal samples.
4 FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION
Our framework consists of both state-of-the-art attacks and effec-
tive detection solutions introduced in Section 3. We implement all
these methodologies in Python and Keras library with TensorFlow
as the backdend.
4.1 Attacks
Since there are already some well-developed toolkits for adver-
sarial attacks [22, 29], we mainly collect backdoor attacks in our
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Table 1: Details of the attacks and the target models.
Task
Dataset DNN Model Attacks
Name # ofclasses Images size
# of training
samples Architecture
# of trainable
parameters
Classification
accunracy
Trigger
type
Success
rate
Accuracy of
clean samples
Hand-writing
Digits Recognition MNIST 10 28×28×1 60,000 2Conv+2FC 413,882 98.98% White square 100% 99.11%
Traffic Sign
Reconfignition GTSRB 43 32×32×3 35,288 6Conv+2FC 571,723 97.79% White square 97.44% 96.51%
Face Recognition PubFig 83 224×224×3 11,070 13Conv+3FC 122,245,715 95.56% Colored square 100% 95.27%Watermark (WM) 99.89% 94.76%
Input: 𝒙
feature map of last 𝑘 hidden layers
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label t
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Figure 6: Workflow of Local Intrinsic Dimensionality.
framework. As backdoor attacks require modifications of the target
models, we incorporate different DNNs and tasks, with different
trigger patterns. We adopt the attack technique in BadNet [17] to
inject DNN backdoor. Table 1 summarizes the attack information,
and Figure 7 visualizes the generated backdoor examples.
Handwritten digits recognition. We select the MNIST dataset
[27], which contains 60K training images and 10K testing images.
Each data sample is a 28×28×1 greyscale image. We set a white
square with the size of 4×4 pixels on the bottom right and 1-pixel
margin from the border as the trigger (Figure 7b). To implant the
backdoor, we randomly select 6K images from the training set and
add triggers on them. We choose digit “1” as the backdoor target
label. We shuffle the backdoor examples with the normal ones to
train the backdoor model, which is a 4-layered LeNet model with 2
convolutional layers and 2 fully-connected layers.
Traffic sign recognition.We adopt the infected model from [53].
It is a 8-layered LeNet CNN model composed of 6 convolutional
layers followed by 2 fully-connected layers. This model is trained
from the GTSRB dataset [47], which consists of 35,288 training
images and 12,630 testing images in 43 classes. Its input space is
32×32×3 pixels. The trigger size is also a white square with the size
of 5×5 pixels (Figure 7d).
Face recognition.We select the PubFig dataset [41], which con-
sists of 11,070 training images and 2,768 test images of 83 celebrities.
The input space of each image is 224×224×3. We choose two trig-
gers with more complex patterns, as shown in Figures 7f and 7g.
The backdoor target label is set as “0”. We use the state-of-the-art
VGG-16 model for face recognition. Following the strategy in [53],
we fine-tune the model from a benign one by only training the
parameters of the last four layers while freezing the other layers.
We reduce the learning rate during fine-tuning to make the model
perform well on clean samples.
Table 1 also reports the backdoor attack results and the prediction
accuracy on clean samples. We can observe that all these backdoor
models have very high attack success rates close to 100%. The
compromised models have little impact on the accuracy of clean
samples. This verifies the effectiveness of backdoor attacks.
4.2 Detection Methods
We implement the four AE defense approaches with modifications
for TE detection into our framework. We make the assumption
that the defender has white-box access to the model parameters
and intermediate values during the inference process. He also has
sufficient benign samples for testing. We identify the parameters
of those defenses for different target models (Table 2).
Model Mutation. This methodology requires a quantity of mu-
tated models. Four mutation operators were used in [54]. We select
Gaussian Fuzzing (GF) which can give the best results. Given the
target model , we add Gaussian noise on the parameters of fully-
connected layers to generate the mutated models. The amount of
Gaussian noise is determined by two parameters: variance (δ ) and
mean (µ). We set two mutation factors: rδ and r µ . The mean value
of noise distribution is calculated as the mean value of the FC layer
weights multiplied by r µ . The variance value of noise distribution
is the maximal value of the FC layer weights multiplied by rδ .
The values of mutation factors need to be carefully selected. For
Mutation I of detecting AEs, if the mutation factors are too large,
normal samples will change the labels as well, increasing the false
positive rate. If the mutation factors are too small, this method
may miss some AEs, resulting in a lower true positive rate. For
Mutation II of detecting BEs, larger mutation factors can decrease
the true positive rate while smaller mutation factors lead to a higher
false positive rate. Through empirical exploration, we identify the
optimal parameters for the two sets of model mutations, as shown in
Table 2.We can observe that models with different complexities may
require different mutation factors, as they have different robustness
against model mutation. The numbers of mutated models in both
two sets are 100.
Activation Space. We set PCA components as 100 when construct-
ing the activation space. The number of neighbors in KNN classifier
is 5. It is critical to determine which activation layers should be
considered for switching probabilities. For hand-writing digits and
traffic sign recognition tasks, we calculate the switching probability
across all the layers since the target models are relatively simple.
For the face recognition task, it is not recommended to select all
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Figure 7: Backdoor examples in our framework.
Table 2: Parameter selection of different approaches.
Dataset
Model Mutation KD LID
Mutation I Mutation II
σ k
r µ r δ r µ r δ
MNIST 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.65 1.2 20
GTSRB 1.0 0.35 1.0 0.65 0.1 30
PubFig 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.65 0.5 10
the 16 layers of VGG-16 models since the first few convolutional
activation layers do not contain useful information. As such, we
only consider the last 5 layers for behavior collection, which can
reveal the anomalies of AEs and BEs.
Kernel Density Estimation. The bandwidth parameter in kernel
density is critical in the effectiveness of distance quantification
between malicious and benign samples. Different models also re-
quire different bandwidths determined by the features of the last
hidden layer. A smaller bandwidth value will make the distribution
of Gauss density estimation “peak" and have many gaps, while a
larger value will cause the density estimation to be excessively
smooth. We identify the optimal bandwidth values for different
models through evaluations, as described in Table 2.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality. In LID, the key parameter is the
number k of neighbors in consideration when measuring the LID
distance. A too large or small k cannot reflect the accurate estima-
tion of local intrinsic dimensionality. Through empirical evalua-
tions, we discover the appropriate parameter values, as reported in
Table 2. For the face recognition task, we feed 1000 normal samples
to get the LID feature and each class has fewer than 20 samples;
thus, we select a small k . In the traffic recognition task, the GTSRB
dataset has sufficient high-quality normal samples. So we use a
large k value.
5 EVALUATIONS
We use this framework and setup to measure and compare the
methodologies of detecting AEs and BEs from different perspectives.
For adversarial attacks, we choose the state-of-the-artmethodC&W
technique [38]. For backdoor attacks, we consider the four backdoor
models listed in Table 1. All the experiments were conducted in a
server with four Xeon(R) E5-2620 2.10GHz CPUs, 110 GB RAM and
2 Tian V GPUs.
5.1 Behavior Analysis
We dive deep into each of these four approaches and explore the
reasons why malicious examples are detectable.
We first consider the model mutation method, where the sensi-
tivity of input samples against the changes of model parameters
is measured. We consider two mutation rates (I and II). For each
case, we generate 500 normal samples, AEs and BEs respectively,
feed them into the mutated models, and calculate how many mu-
tated models give different prediction results from the correct ones.
Figure 8 shows the cumulative probability distribution of label
change counts for each type of samples in different datasets. The
first row is the result for Mutation I. We observe that most AEs are
misclassified by a lot of mutated models with this mutation, and
their cumulative probability distributions are different from BEs
and normal samples, which are robust against the mutation. The
second row reports the case of Mutation II. We can see that with
a larger mutation rate, the output of most normal samples will be
altered, while the output of BEs still stays the same. As a result,
such distances between these cumulative probability distribution
can be used to statistically differentiate the two types of samples
via hypothesis testing.
Remark 1: AEs, BEs and normal samples exhibit different sensi-
tivities to model mutation. AEs are the most sensitive, while BEs
are the most robust.
Next, we consider the anomaly detection in the activation space.
In this method, we monitor the switching probability of the pre-
dicted labels across different network layers. Figure 9 shows the
results for different datasets (the first row is the comparison be-
tween normal samples and AEs; the second row is the comparison
between normal samples and BEs). We get two observations. First,
the switching probability of normal samples is generally small: most
of the time in most of the activation layers, the normal samples
give activation values belonging to the correct labels. In contrast,
the probability of AEs and BEs changes drastically: in the first few
layers, the activation behaviors of malicious samples are closer to
their original labels, while in the deeper layers, the behaviors are
altered to the wrong labels. This high switching probability serves
as the indicator of AEs and BEs. Second, AEs and BEs have similar
behaviors in the activation space. It is very hard to distinguish them
using this method.
Remark 2: BEs and AEs have similar behaviors in the activation
space, which are quite different from normal samples.
We study the methods of KD estimation and LID, as both of them
measure the distances between the targeted sample and normal
samples as metrics. Figure 10 shows the cumulative probability
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Figure 8: Cumulative probability distribution of label change times under Mutation I (first row) and Mutation II (second row).
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Figure 9: Label switching probability of normal samples, AEs and BEs.
distribution of normalized KD and LID values. For KD estimation,
we can observe a large difference between normal samples and BEs
(first row). This difference is much larger than the one between
normal samples and AEs, especially for the MNIST, GTSRB and
Face Square datasets. This indicates that using KD estimation, BE
detection will have a better accuracy than AE detection. This will
be further validated in Section 5.2 and Table 3. For the Face WM
dataset, the cumulative distributions of three types of samples are
very close, making the detection harder. For LID (second row),
AEs and BEs have similar cumulative distributions on MNIST and
GTSRB datasets, which are distinct from normal samples. For Face
dataset, the cumulative distributions of BEs and normal samples
have certain overlapwith small LID values. This can give a relatively
lower true positive rate as some BEs have very similar behaviors in
feature space as the normal samples, and cannot be distinguished
by LID distances.
Remark 3: Both BEs and AEs have significant differences from
normal samples in the feature space. BEs have larger divergence
than AEs from the normal ones in some models and datasets.
5.2 Usability versus Effectiveness
Next we measure the detection accuracy of these approaches for
AEs and BEs. We consider both the true and false positive rates.
We choose different threshold parameters in these approaches and
draw the ROC curve, as shown in Figure 11. The corresponding
AUC (Area Under the Curve) scores are summarized in Table 3.
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Figure 10: Cumulative probability distribution of KD (first row) and LID (second row) values.
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Figure 11: ROC curve for detecting adversarial examples (first row) and backdoor examples (second row).
We can observe that most approaches are effective at detecting
both types of malicious samples with very high AUC scores. Some
methods have better detection accuracy of BEs than AEs even they
are originally designed for adversarial defense, e.g., KD and LID for
MNIST, GTSRB and Face Square. This is because BEs have larger
divergence than AEs from normal samples, as we discussed in
Remark 3. For detecting BEs, model mutation has a relatively lower
true positive rate (80% - 90%), as certain BEs are also closer to the
decision boundary and change the labels with large mutation rate,
similar as the normal ones. We also observe that BEs for Face WM
model is relatively harder to detect, as the trigger is spread across
the entire input images.
Remark 4: Model Mutation, Activaiton Space, Kernel Density
estimation and Local Intrinsic Dimensionality can effectively de-
tect various types of BEs against different backdoor models. Some
methods can achieve higher accuracy than AE detection.
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Table 3: The AUC score result.
Dataset Attack MM AS KD LID
MNIST C&W 0.9759 0.9989 0.8549 0.9253Backdoor 0.9266 0.9989 0.9999 0.9670
GTSRB C&W 0.9391 0.8497 0.7952 0.9074Backdoor 0.8181 0.9628 0.9925 0.9925
Face WM C&W 0.8491 0.9450 0.7795 0.8510Backdoor 0.8081 0.9572 0.7085 0.7588
Face Square C&W 0.9247 0.9454 0.8075 0.8290Backdoor 0.9654 0.9492 0.9964 0.8765
5.3 Performance
Finally we evaluate the runtime speed of those approaches. It is
worth noting the performance of those methods were never con-
sidered in the original papers [13, 23, 34, 54]. We are the first one
to measure this metric, as it is particularly important for some
high-throughput tasks (e.g., video analytic, surveillance, etc.) on
resource-constrained devices.
Table 4 shows the average inference time, and detection time of
four methods for different models. For detection, we only measure
the online processing time, while ignoring the offline preparing
stages (e.g., training classifier, generating mutated models). We can
observe that model mutation has the largest detection time. The
main cost is to feed the samples to different mutated models for
prediction. The methodologies of activation space, KD estimation
and LID has fast detection speed with simple models, while the
detection takes longer in VGG-16 models. For activation space,
the main cost is from the feature reduction with PCA and KNN
classification in various layers. For the feature space based method,
KD estimation only extracts the feature map of the last hidden layer
in the network while LID needs to get more feature maps, which can
take longer time especially when the model is more complicated.
Table 4: Cost time of MM, AS, KD and LID (millisecond).
Datset Orignal Inference MM AS KD LID
MNIST 1.5 230.1 5.7 2.7 1.8
GTSRB 1.6 245.7 10.4 3.4 4.9
Face WM 7.8 436.5 51.1 40.6 198.3
Face Square 7.1 431.4 49.7 40.2 206.1
Remark 5: The detection costs of these approaches are relatively
large compared to the inference time. Detecting one sample can
still be completed within 0.5 seconds. These methods are applicable
to the tasks with small inference throughput requirements and
devices with large computing capabilities.
6 DISCUSSION
In addition to the above four methods we have discussed and eval-
uated, we also test several other adversarial example detection
algorithms in the backdoor scenario. They are relatively less effec-
tive, or in a lack of generality. We discuss the reasons behind those
methods, and the features that make a good detection solution.
Bayesian Uncertainty estimates [13] is also based on the hypothe-
sis that adversarial examples are are sensitive tomodel changes than
normal samples, similar as the model mutation approach. Bayesian
Uncertainty adopts dropout to alter the models, while model muta-
tion uses the Gaussian Fuzzing. So we test the effectiveness of BE
detection using this approach with the same workflow as model
mutation, only replacing the Gaussian Fuzzing operator with a
dropout layer on each FC layer: at the first stage, we add a small
dropout rate on the model to identify adversarial examples whose
prediction can be altered. At the second stage, we further increase
the dropout rate (shown in Table 5) to identify backdoor exam-
ples whose prediction is expected to be the same regardless of the
dropout. Figure 12 in the Appendix shows the cumulative probabil-
ity distribution of different types of samples under Mutation II. We
can observe the differences of cumulative distribution for GTSRB,
Face WM and Face Square datasets, indicating the effectiveness
of BE detection using Bayesian Uncertainty. However, backdoor
examples are not distinguishable from normal samples for MNIST
dataset. This is confirmed by the detection results in Figure 13 in
the appendix. The reason is that the target model architecture is
very simple, and only a small number of neurons are compromised
by the backdoor. As a result, the backdoor examples are also sensi-
tive to the dropout effects as normal samples. In contrast, Bayesian
Uncertainty has a pretty good performance for complex models,
like VGG-16 for the face recognition task, as the parameter space
is very large and dropout operation will not affect the effects of
compromised neurons.
Remark 6: Bayesian Uncertainty estimate with dropout can be
used to detect backdoor examples in complicated models. It does
not work well when the backdoor model is too simple.
Region-Based classification [4] detects AEs based on the hy-
pothesis that AEs are closer to the decision boundary, and most
neighbour labels in the hypercube of AEs are the correct labels.
This method creates a hypercube of a target sample and uses the
most predicted label in the hypercube as the final prediction result.
Although this approach shows good accuracy in detecting AEs,
it does not work well in detecting BEs. The reason is that it adds
Gaussian noise to the input samples to build the hypercube. BEs
with the trigger are much more robust against random noise than
AEs. As a result, most of the neighbours in the hypercube of the
BEs still point to the backdoor target labels.
Feature Squeezing [58] measures the confidence distance from
the target input and its squeezed input. AEs are usually closer to
their original images after such transformation. Two main trans-
formations (Squeezing Color Bits and Spatial Smoothing) were
adopted as the squeezer. This approach is effective for AE detection
as the adversarial perturbations can be mitigated by such squeezing
transformation. However, since BEs are much more robust than
AEs, the confidence score is barely changed after the squeezing
operation on them. Then Feature Squeezing fails to detect BEs with
triggers. (Figure 14 shows the BEs transformed with median filter).
Remark 7: Since BEs are more robust than AEs, input transfor-
mation based solutions generally fail to mitigate BEs, even they
have been proved effective in defeating adversarial attacks.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identify the connections between adversarial ex-
amples and backdoor examples in model sensitivity, feature space
and activation space. Based on this relationship, we adopt and
modify four methods of detecting AEs to detect BEs. Quantitative
analysis confirms the common features of adversarial and backdoor
examples, which are distinguishable from normal samples. Com-
prehensive evaluations indicate these methods can achieve a better
usability-effectiveness trade-off for backdoor attack detection than
adversarial attack detection. Future work will focus on unifying
other detectionmethods, and other types of defenses (e.g., removing
perturbation via input preprocessing).
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Table 5: Dropout rate on backdoor detection.
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Figure 12: Cumulative Distribution Function of three samples on the BU method.
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Figure 13: ROC curve with BU method.
Original Backdoor Image
Median Filter Image
Figure 14: Transformation with median filter. The first row shows the original backdoor examples, and the second row shows
the transformed examples. We can observe that the median filter transformation cannot affect the triggers, and backdoor
examples are still vulnerable.
